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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
ancing these interests as transcending the public interest in alocative
efficiency, the decision may represent injudicious tampering. On the
other hand, if one views the balancing process and the benefits of allo-
cative efficiency as concerns of comparable magnitude, then the net
benefit from the tradeoff may not be apparent for some time.
JEFFREY LYNCH HARRISON
Civil Procedure-Collateral Estoppel: The Fourth Circuit
Squeezes an Oversized Judgment Through a Narrow Issue
Collateral estoppel' is a procedural doctrine whereby essential
issues that have been decided in a prior action are treated as conclu-
sive in any subsequent proceeding, thus foreclosing a party from reliti-
gating the same issue.2 Among the policy objectives collateral estop-
pel furthers are safeguarding against inconsistent results and avoiding
needless litigation. The seductiveness of these ends, however, should
never obscure the necessity for careful analysis of whether the issue
asserted as collaterally estopped was both actually determined -and
substantially identical with the present one, lest a litigant be unfairly
denied his day in court. In Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Hanft,2
the Fourth Circuit held that a seemingly ambiguous finding by a state
court in an action to recover on a promissory note that an affirmative
defense of duress based upon an alleged threat of a group boycott had
not been established was conclusive as to whether the threat was in
fact made in a subsequent affirmative antitrust action brought by the
defendant in a federal district court.
Azalea Drive-In Theatre, plaintiff in the federal action, leased
films from defendant distributors under agreements providing for pay-
ment of a percentage of the box office receipts. These agreements
also authorized periodic inspections to insure that the theatre was not
1. Also known as a species of res judicata or issue preclusion.
2. The Restatement of Judgments defines the rule as follows: "When an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive
in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
3. 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976).
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underreporting its receipts. Such inspections were. performed by the
accountant for the distributors' law firm, who concluded that the the-
atre had misrepresented its receipts by as much as $240,000. The
parties managed to negotiate a settlement for $70,000, and Azalea
executed a promissory note for this purpose.4
When Azalea failed to make the first payment, the distributors
initiated a suit in a Virginia state court to recover on the note.'
Azalea set forth three affirmative defenses: (1) that the note was
given without consideration, (2) that it was given by their president
under duress, he having been threatened by the accountant with a
group boycott by the distributors unless he agreed to the settlement,
and (3) that the note was obtained in violation of federal antitrust
laws.' The state judge struck the third defense and an antitrust coun-
terclaim on the ground that the enforcement of the antitrust laws was
under exclusive federal jurisdiction. He then tried the case without
a jury, and received testimony from both sides on whether a group
boycott had in fact been threatened.7
In the judge's findings of fact and conclusions of lawhe framed
one of the questions of ultimate fact to be: "Was there sufficient and
convincing evidence of duress on the part of the plaintiffs to the detri-
ment of the defendants?"8  For all questions posed, including the
preceding, he gave only the general answer, "[a]s the trier of the
facts, the Court decides same in favor of the plaintiffs," and granted
judgment for plaintiffs.
Meanwhile, Azalea had filed a claim in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the distributors
charging a Clayton Act violation and the use of "monopolistic and
economic threat, coercion and duress" in obtaining the note.10 After
the state court rendered its judgment, the distributors amended their
answer to assert that Azalea was collaterally estopped from again liti-
gating the question of the alleged threat and attendant duress. The
district court, noting the lack of specific findings, ruled that the doc-
4. Id. at 714.
5. Id. The state trial court decision is unreported. The statement of facts con-
cerning that proceeding is taken from the summary by the Fourth Circuit.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 716 n.2.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 714; Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Sargoy, 394 F. Supp. 568 (1975)
(mem.).
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trine should not apply since it was possible that the- state judge found
that a threat was made without finding that it constituted duress."1
Azalea then prevailed in the jury trial.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, through Chief Judge Hayns-
worth, reversed on the ground that the core factual dispute, namely
whether, or not a threat of group boycott had been made, was the
same in each suit. 12  Believing that the state judge in deciding the
facts for the distributors must have found that no threat had been
made, the court concluded that under established principles collateral
estoppel should have been invoked. The court also rejected Azalea's
claim that application of collateral estoppel in the federal suit would
compromise its seventh amendment right to a jury trial since no such
right had been available in the former suit on the note by determining
that the policies underlying collateral estoppel are not overborne sim-
ply because the form of the fact finding process in the first forum
is unlike that of the second."3
Judge Butzner vigorously dissented on three separate grounds.
He based the first on an analysis of the difference between the state
claim of duress and the federal claim of an antitrust violation: to
prove duress Azalea had to establish not only that the accountant
threatened a group boycott, but also that such a threat was unlawful
under state law and "was sufficient to overcome the will of a person
-of ordinary firmness,"'14 while .to make out a per se antitrust violation
only a threat of a group boycott need be proven. Since the ground
of decision was unclear on the record, the judge could have found
that no threat had been made, or, alternatively, that the threat had
been made but that it was not unlawful or that it fell short of over-
coming the will of Azalea's president. Thus collateral estoppel
should not apply for the reason that the dispositive matter litigated
and determined might have been only one of several possibilities, and
it had not been clearly shown to be only the existence or not of the
threat. A second factor that he asserted to weigh against collateral
estoppel was the fact that Azalea had to prove by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence the duress defense while the antitrust claim en-
tailed only the ordinary civil burden of proof -of a preponderance of
11. 540 F.2d at 714; 394 F. Supp. at 575.
12. 540 F.2d at 714.
13. Id. at 715.
14. Id. at 716 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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the evidence. 5 Lastly, Judge Butzner asserted that the application
of collateral estoppel would be a compromise of Azalea's seventh
amendment right to a jury trial on the antitrust claim.' 6
Prior cases illustrate those situations in which the invocation of
collateral estoppel is deemed. inappropriate. Russell v. Place,'7 cited
by the dissent,' 8 refused to allow collateral estoppel to foreclose a
party who had been found guilty of infringement of a patent from con-
testing the validity of that patent in a subsequent suit when the patent
consisted of two claims and it could not be discerned on which claim
the first judgment had been rendered. The rule stated in its holding
has never been questioned:
[I]t must appear, either upon the face of the record or be shown
by extrinsic evidence, that the precise question was raised and de-
termined in the former suit. If there be any uncertainty on this
head in the record,-as, for example, if it appears that several
distinct matters may have been litigated, upon one or more of
which the judgment may have passed, without indicating which of
them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was ren-
dered,-the whole subject-matter of the action will be at large, and
open to a new contention, unless this uncertainty be removed by
extrinsic evidence showing the precise point involved and deter-
mined.'9
Thus, reasoning by speculative inference from an ambiguous record
is not permitted to show that the issues are the same. There must
be demonstrable- evidence from which such a conclusion, and no
other, necessarily follows.
Closely.related to this concept is the mirror situation in which
the first judgment rests on alternative grounds, either of which by it-
self would justify the result, and the determination of each or all of
them is evident from the record. Under these circumstances, unlike
the Russell situation, what issues were actually decided is known. Al-
though this knowledge might seem to vitiate the argument against col-
lateral estoppel based on uncertainty, the recent trend is to deny pre-
clusion in this situation also. The Tentative Draft of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, contrary to- the first Restatement,20 takes the
view that neither of two alternative determinations by itself should be
15. Id. at 717.
16. Id. at 718.
17. 94 U.S. 606 (1876).
18. 540 F.2d at 715.
19. 94 U.S. at 608.
20. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment n (1942). "Where the judg-
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conclusive in a subsequent suit.21  The recent case of Halpern v.
Schwartz22 refused to give collateral estoppel effect in an action for
objections to discharge of a party who had been adjudicated bankrupt
on three separate grounds, any one of which would have been con-
clusive standing alone, when only one of the grounds required a find-
ing of actual intent to defraud, which was the issue in the second suit.
After surveying the authorities and concluding that they were not
overwhelmingly compelling either way on this close question, the
court offered the rationale that, "if the court in the prior case were
sure as to one of the alternative grounds and this ground by itself was
sufficient to support the judgment, then it may not feel as constrained
to give rigorous consideration to the alternative grounds," implying
that in such a situation the "full and fair consideration" generally re-
quired of the issue in the first instance may be lacking.24
Another limiting factor in regard to collateral estoppel is a change
in the burden of proof. Usually this circumstance arises when the
first action is criminal in nature and the second civil; an acquittal in
the former under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard will not
preclude relitigation of the issues in the latter under the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" standard.2" In Helvering v. Mitchell26 a defend-
ant who had been acquitted on a criminal tax evasion charge was held
not to be immune from a civil suit to collect a deficiency based on
ment is based upon the matters litigated as alternative grounds, the judgment is deter-
minative on both grounds, although either alone would have been sufficient to support
the judgment." Id. See. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1942), for support of the first Restatement position.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment i (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973). "If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of
two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the
result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone." Id.
22. 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 105.
24. But cf. Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1926).
The defendant's position comes to this: That a finding is not res judicata, if
the court could have reached the same result by other reasoning. . . . But
the principle has never been carried so far' as to discredit findings which are
collateral only if the cause had been disposed of upon other principles than
those which the court had a mind to apply. On the contrary, if a court decides
a case on two grounds, each is a good estoppel.
Id. at 724. Judge Learned Hand's last sentence could be taken as standing for the
contrary view, but the case may be distinguished in that the alternative ground asserted
by the defendant was only a hypothetical one, and not included in the first court's
findings. See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 107 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970).
25. A conviction, however, may serve as an estoppel, since satisfaction of the
higher burden of proof must necessarily logically include satisfaction of the lower one.
26. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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the same set of alleged facts. The court stated that "[tihe difference
in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes
application of the doctrine of res judicata. The acquittal was 'merely
... an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all
reasonable doubt of the accused.' "217 This principle has also been
applied further down the burden of proof spectrum when an admin-
istrative proceeding follows a civil suit.28
A corollary to this precept is that a party who loses on a claim
in which one element to be proven is some specific intent or other
subjective state on the part of his adversary will not be estop'ped from
litigating a different claim based on the same act, but in which intent
is immaterial. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United
States, 9 a case also illustrating the criminal-civil dichotomy,3° the
Government was not estopped from pressing a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding for imported merchandise not included in a declaration and
entry under the tariff laws even though defendant had been acquitted
on criminal charges stemming from the same importation. The court
reasoned that for a criminal conviction the Government had to prove
a willful intent to defraud as well as the act of unlawful importation.
An acquittal could have entailed a finding that the act was done but
that the intent was lacking. Since in a forfeiture action the Government
had only to prove that the property was imported without a declar-
ation, the criminal acquittal could not be accepted as a conclusive
27. Id. at 397 (quoting Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 302 (1914)). See also
Harper v. Blasi, 112 Colo. 518, "151 P.2d 760 (1944), noting that the same testimony
might be insufficient to support a guilty verdict against a criminal defendant but never-
theless suffice to discharge the lower burden of proof necessary for a verdict against
a civil defendant. Id. at 521-22, 151 P.2d at 761. But see Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886), in which the Government was estopped from litigating
a civil action for seizure of untaxed liquor after it had failed to obtain a conviction
in a criminal trial for attempt to defraud the United States of the tax on it.
28. In Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1968), a longshoreman
first sued a shipowner for negligence in connection with injuries sustained aboard ship.
The shipowner impleaded the employer, and it was determined that the longshoreman
had in fact sustained no injury when he fell. The court held that collateral estoppel
should not apply on the question of injury when the longshoreman subsequently sought
compensation from his employer under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act because a lesser quantum of proof is necessary to establish a claim
in that proceeding and the administrative policy is to resolve all doubtful fact questions
in favor of the injured employee. Strictly speaking, the court did not base its holding
solely on the difference in burden of proof, but also because the nature of evidence
and procedural rules are in general more "free-wheeling" in administrative proceedings.
Id. at 188.
29. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
30. Id. at 235.
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finding that this act was not done.3 1 A slight modulation on this
theme is when the intent must still be proven in the second suit, but
the burden of proof is less. The proposed Restatement, which sup-
ports the general rule of excepting collateral estoppel in the case of
a changed burden of proof,8 2 provides a hypothetical illustration:
A brings an action against B to recover on a promissory note.
B defends on the ground that he was induced by A's friend to give
this and other notes in the series, but fails to establish fraud by
clear and convincing evidence as required by law. After judgment
for A, the law is changed to provide that in such cases fraud need
be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. In an action
by A on'another note in the series, B is not precluded from assert-
ing the defense of fraud.83
Thus, the requirement of proof of intent in the first suit not only aborts
an estoppel in the second suit when .by a qualitative change in the
burden of proof intent is not an essential element, but also when by
a quantitive change intent is still an essential element, but the neces-
sary quantum of proof is less.
The underlying justification for denying collateral estoppel when
the burden of proof changes is that the policy of preventing inconsist-
ent results is inoperative in such a case."4 Differing results under dif-
fering burdens of proof are neither contrary to logic nor repugnant
to considerations of fairness; indeed, considerations of procedural in-
tegrity may occasionally compel a different result in such a case.
31. Id. at 234-35. The concern in this analysis with the ambiguity of the first
determination also echoes the rule of Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876). See text
accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
provides:
Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion.
(d) The party against whom preclusion is sought had. a significantly
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action
than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or
the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action
33. Id. § 68.1, Comment on Clause (d), Illustration 11.
34. But cf. Harding v. Carr, 79 RI. 32, 83 A.2d 79 (1951). In this action
for injuries sustained in an auto accident, plaintiff was estopped from asserting that
the driver of defendant's car had his permission, when in an earlier suit against defend-
ant's insurer plaintiff failed to show such permission. Collateral estoppel was applied
over a dissent, even though in the second action the burden would have shifted entirely
to the owner to rebut the presumption of permission. The court stated: "The prin-
ciple of estoppel as here involved is based on the adjudication of an identical and
ultimate issue and not on the question of which party may legally have the burden
of proving or disproving such issue." Id. at 43, 83 A.2d at 84.
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Another situation in which collateral estoppel may be denied,
which entails consideration of policies extrinsic to the general policies
of collateral estoppel, and concerning which there is less agreement,
is when a right to jury trial attaches to the second suit but not the
first. In Rachal v. Hill3 5 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court's. ruling in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover"--that the seventh amendment right to jury trial requires
that legal issues must be tried first before a jury when both legal and
equitable issues are to be tried in the same suit-also mandates that
the right to jtry trial may not be lost by operation of collateral estoppel
to issues in an entirely separate suit.s 7  Thus, Rachal, who had been
issued an injunction in connection with a manipulative stock scheme
in an action initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, was
not estopped from litigating the issue of the scheme when stock-
holders subsequently pressed forward a derivative suit against him
averring the same scheme.88
The Rachal decision has been generally disapproved. Only one
case appears to have followed it.3 9 The Restatement, probably in
response, has taken the contrary position.40  Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc.,41 though distinguishing Rachal on the facts in that the
estoppel in Crane was mutual, questioned in dictum the correctness
35. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
37. 435 F.2d at 64.
In light of the great respect afforded in Beacon Theatres . . . and its
progeny, for a litigant's right to have legal claims tried first before a jury
in an action where legal and equitable claims are joined, it would be anom-
alous to hold that the appellants have lost their right to a trial by jury on
the issue of whether they are liable to respond in damages for violations
of the security laws because of a prior adverse determination by the district
court of the same issue in an action in which their present adversary was
not a party and which arose in a different context from the present action.
Id.
38. The court seemed to narrow its holding by emphasizing that the asserted
estoppel was non-mutual, i.e., the party seeking to assert it was not an adversary in
the first suit. See note 37 supra. It is fair to read Rachal as signifying that when
the estoppel is mutual, then the jury trial issue should not abort it. The distinction
seems rather cabalistic; perhaps the court thought that the right to jury trial somehow
renews itself at the appearance of new adversaries.
39. Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). This
holding appears even broader than Rachal, since a right to jury trial was present in
the first suit, but was waived.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973). "The determination of an issue by a judge in a proceeding conducted without
a jury is conclusive in a subsequent action whether or not there would have been
a right to a jury in that subsequent action if collateral estoppel did not apply." Id.
41. 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973).
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of the Rachal holding.4 2  In addition, two cases whose factual pat-
terns seemed to be appropriate for a Rachal analysis did not even refer
to the issue.43 One article has attacked the Rachal holding as a leap of
faith from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the seventh amendment
that does unwarranted violence to the policies of collateral estoppel.4 ,
One consideration not directly raised in the Azalea opinion is tlat
the policies underpinning the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal courts of the administration of the antitrust laws mandate,
under the rule announced by Learned Hand in Lyons v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,45 that determination of antitrust issues decided in state
court proceedings not be binding on the federal courts. In Lyons de-
fendant in a state court breach of contract action lost on a defense
alleging antitrust violations in the marketing of lamps. Defendant
then sued in federal court, averring the same antitrust violations.
Although acknowledging that the state court determination would or-
dinarily be treated as an estoppel, 4" the court nevertheless stated:
[T]he grant to the district courts of exclusive jurisdiction over the
action for treble damages should be taken to imply an immunity
of their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere; at least on
occasions, like those at bar, where the putative estoppel includes
the whole nexus of facts that make up the wrong.47
The policy reason offered for this distinction was that the grant of
exclusive jurisdiction evidenced a congressional intent that the antitrust
laws be uniformly administered, 48 even though it may be permissible
42. Id. at 343 n.15.
43. Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081
(5th Cir. 1969); and Paramount Transp. Sys. v. Local 150, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
436 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), both allowed collateral estoppel on the
issue of liability in damage actions under the National Labor Relations Act after the
unions had been found guilty of secondary boycotts under the Act by the National
Labor Relations Board in actions for injunctions. The Fifth Circuit in Rachal did
not bother to distinguish its own decision in Painters. The Ninth Circuit was prob-
ably not yet aware of Rachal when it handed down Paramount.
44. Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment.
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HAgv. L REv. 442 (1971). The authors stress the waste of
judicial resources incurred by retrying complex issues in arguing that neither the sev-
enth amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court nor considerations of fairness
should produce such a result. Id. at 458.
45. 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955).
46. Id. at 188.
47. Id. at 189; cf. Scott, supra note 20, at 18-19 (litigants should not be precluded
from retrying issues in a court having jurisdiction over the matter when such issues
were incidentally decided by a court that would not have had jurisdiction to decide.
such issues in an action brought expressly to determine them, even though the judgment
in the initial suit is still valid).
48. 222 F.2d at 189.
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for state courts incidentally to decide antitrust issues when they arise
in a defense to a contract action.49 One commentator has also cited
the seventh amendment right to jury trial, setting the burden of proof,
and the choice of forum as important legislative considerations in the
federal administration of antitrust law. 50
A cursory reading of Lyons might imply that collateral estoppel
by a state court judgment is never appropriate in a federal antitrust
action. In distinguishing the situation in Lyons from that in Becher
v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc.,51 however, Hand seemed to concede
that prior state court determinations of pure fact, as opposed to those
of law or mixed fact and law, may be conclusive. After quoting from
Becher that "'[e]stablishing a fact and giving a specific effect to it
by judgment are quite distinct,' "52 he made the somewhat cryptic ob-
49. Id. at 190. Of course, the Azalea case may be distinguished in that the
trial judge refused to entertain the antitrust defense, citing the federal courts' exclusive
jurisdiction in the area. Although counterclaims and affirmative treble damages suits
based on the federal antitrust laws cannot be heard in state courts, such courts may nev-
ertheless, in their discretion, entertain defenses based on them. As the court stated
in Lyons v. Westinghouse: "We think that the state court had undoubted jurisdiction,
notwithstanding § 15 of Title 15, U.S.C.A., to decide the merits of the first defence
. .222 F.2d at 187. Such defenses are appropriate only when the alleged anti-
trust violations "inhere" in the contract itself and the contract is intrinsically illegal.
Id. at 187-88. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 755
(1947). Nevertheless, state courts are not bound to entertain such defenses in any
case, since, "[o]bviously, state law governs in general the rights and duties of
sellers and purchasers of goods ...... Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 519 (1958).
It appears that if in the instant case the note would not have been obtained but for
a threat of group boycott, a per se antitrust violation, see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 & n.5 (1959), then it could plausibly be argued
that the illegality "inhered" in the note itself. Nevertheless, the decision by the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court on appeal in Azalea Drive-In Theatre,. Inc. v. Sargoy, 215 Va.
714, 720, 214 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1975), that "[tihe alleged federal antitrust violation
was collateral to the main issue in plaintiffs motion for judgment, and it was not
a viable defense in this action" rendered the matter moot. Cf. Medusa Corp. v. Gordon,
496 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1974) (violation of antitrust laws held not to be a valid
defense under Michigan law).
50. Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior
State-Court Deterniinations, 53 VA. L. Rav. 1360, 1365, 1383 n.85 (1967).
51. 279 U.S. 388 (1928). Becher involved a machinist's contract to construct
a machine, whereby he agreed to keep information entrusted to him secret and not
to make use of it himself. He breached this trust by obtaining a patent for the inven-
tion on his own, and his employer obtained from a New York court a decree holding
the machinist a trustee ex maleficio of the invention and commanding him to assign
the patent to the employer. When the machinist turned around and sued the employer
for infringement of the patent, the Supreme Court held that he was estopped from
asserting the claim by the state decree. One ground of distinction from Lyons could
have been that the court ruled that the suit was not one arising under the patent
laws at all. The court stated that the cause of action was based on either breach
of contract or wrongful disregard of confidential relations, both of which are independ-
ent of the patent law. Id. at 391.
52. 222 F.2d at 188 (quoting 279 U.S. at 391).
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servation that this proposition suggests that "the distinction [is] be-
tween the finding of one of the constituent facts that together make
up a claim and the entire congeries of such facts, taken as a unit;
an estoppel is good as to the first but not as to the second." 53 The
upshot of this statement seems to be that state court determinations
of discrete, concrete facts, separable from the major premise of a
legal theory based on antitrust law, may properly be invoked for es-
toppel, since such determinations are made -independently of an issue
of law under exclusive federal jurisdiction, and the federal court may
still exercise its prerogative to apply the federal law to the established
facts in order to rule on the merits of the claim as a whole.54
If the majority decision in Azalea is deemed to have impliedly
rejected the countervailing arguments presented by the dissent, then
the decision may retard the developing law of collateral estoppel as
well as undermine already firmly established principles. The state-
ment that "the factual dispute in the federal court was exactly the
same as the factual dispute in the state court"55 is misleading. Certainly
whether a threat of group boycott was made was a threshold question
in both. But stating the obvious does not develop the analysis far
enough; it must also be conclusively shown that the factual question
was actually decided in the former. In view of the ambiguity of the
trial judge's findings, the conclusion that "[w]hen the state trial judge
stated that he found the facts in the plaintiffs favor, he must have
found that no threat had been made,"56 simply does not necessarily
follow from the premise that the factual dispute was the same.
The state judge's findings are only a bit more enlightening than
a general verdict.57 His finding for plaintiffs on the stated issue-"Was
there sufficient and convincing evidence of duress on the part of the
53. Id. The distinction may be. made more lucidly by the Becher opinion itself:
That decrees validating or invalidating patents belong to the Courts of
the United States does not give sacrosanctity to facts that may be conclusive
upon the question in issue. A fact is not prevented from being proved in
any case in which it is material, by the suggestion that if it is true an impor-
tant patent is void-and . . .we can see n6 ground for giving less effect
to proof of such a fact than any other.
279 U.S. at 391-92.
54. See Note, supra note 50, at 1384, pointing out that limiting collateral estoppel
effect to factual determinations safeguards against contravention of any substantial fed-
eral interest.
55. 540 F.2d at 714.
56. Id.
57. General verdicts, with their lack of specific findings, are a great impediment
to the application of collateral estoppel. This could be remedied by a more widespread
use of special verdicts and interrogatories.
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plaintiffs to the 'detriment of the defendants?'" 8-though framed as a
single issue, must be viewed as a multiple finding. Admittedly, it could
mean that no threat was made, but it could also mean that the threat was
not unlawful under state law,59 that the threat was insufficient to over-
come the will of a person of ordinary firmness,60 that defendants' proof
was not sufficiently clear and convincing on the elements of the defense,0'
or some combination of these variables. If the finding is viewed as in-
tending only one or several of these possible conclusions, then it should
come squarely within the rule of Russell v. Place that collateral estoppel
effect should not be given to ambiguous findings. 62 Even if it is viewed
as implying all of them, including that no threat was made, the rule of
Halpern v. Schwartz, that a putative estoppel based on any of alternative
sufficient determinations should not be allowed,63 still should preclude
any estoppel. The requirement that Azalea prove not only that a threat
was made, but also that such threat was sufficient to overcome its vice-
president's will, makes the situation analogous to that of One Lot Emer-
ald Cut Stones, in which it was held that if a subjective element is essen-
tial to the first claim, but not the second, no estoppel will attach.64 Aside
from any ambiguity in the findings, the difference in burden of proof
58. 540 F.2d at 716 n.2.
59. This finding was explicitly made by the Virginia Supreme Court on appeal,
215 Va. at 721, 214 S.E.2d at 136. See note 49 supra.
60. This term of art is generally considered to be an essential element of duress.
See United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414 (1872). "Unlawful duress
is a good defense to a contract if it includes such degree of constraint or danger,
either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, as is sufficient in severity or
apprehension to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." Id.
at 432. The judge might well have concluded that to threaten a boycott is simply
a good business tactic, which an ordinary businessman should be able to take in stride.
61. Duress usually requires the higher burden of "clear and convincing" evidence,
rather than the ordinary civil burden of a "preponderance" of the evidence. Virginia
state law appears to adhere to this requirement. "One who seeks to cancel a contract
for fraud and duress must carry the burden of proof and furnish clear and full proof
of such fraud and duress." Scott v. Scott, 142 Va. 31, 39, 128 S.E. 599, 601 (1925)
(per curiam) (quoting the trial court). The judge's use of the word "convincing"
indicates that this was the standard he was applying.
62. See Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608 (1876).
63. 426 F.2d at 105.
64. 409 U.S. at 234. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones is distinguishable from Azalea
in that in the former the party against whom the estoppel was asserted had failed
to establish fraudulent intent on the part of its adversary, whereas in the latter Azalea
had failed to establish that its own will had been overcome. Nevertheless, it should
make no difference which party is looking into whose head; an element of proof in
addition to the establishment of the objective act is required either way. To establish
the antitrust claim, Azalea had only to show that a threat of a group boycott had
been made, such a threat being a per se antitrust violation. See, e.g., Kor's Inc.
v, Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) and cases cited id. at 212 n.$.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
alone dictates that estoppel is inappropriate, according to Helvering v.
Mitchell and the other cases discussed above.65
One consideration briefly addressed and summarily dismissed by
the Azalea opinion is that of collateral estoppel compromising the right
to jury trial under the antitrust claim. The court stated that "the rules
foreclosing relitigation of factual issues between the same parties serve
such important policies that relitigation should not be allowed though
the fact finding processes in the first tribunal were unlike those which
otherwise would be available in the second."66 Although this declara-
tion could be taken as direct disapproval of the ill-conceived rule of
Rachal v. Hill,67 it persuasiveness is diluted by the omission of any
citation to that case, by the fact that the estoppel in Azalea, being mu-
tual, is thus readily distinguishable, and by the failure to weigh the "im-
portant policies" of collateral estoppel against those of the right to jury
trial in any sort of analytical discussion.
While Lyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.68 is not directly ap-
posite by virtue of the state court's refusal to hear the antitrust defense,
the inference remains strong that if it had ruled on the merits of the
defense and simply found against Azalea without clearly indicating that
a threat of group boycott had not been made, a Lyons analysis would
have dictated that the federal court not be bound.6 9 Thus it seems
anomalous that the federal court should be bound by a judgment based
on a different major premise (duress), when it would not have been
bound by a judgment based on the same major premise (antitrust).
Except for the jury trial issue, any one of the above considerations
standing alone should have mandated that collateral estoppel be re-
fused in the instant case. All are corollaries of the fundamental axiom
that the issue in the first suit must be substantially identical to the issue
in the second, and, taken together, weigh so heavily against the Azalea
opinion that it must be said that the case was wrongly decided. 70 The
65. 303 U.S. at 397; see notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
66. 540 F.2d at 715.
67. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text supra.
69. This is not to say that if such a specific factual finding were made, the
federal court should disregard it. Such a finding would be collateral estoppel. in re
the existence of the threat, and since the merits of the. antitrust claim depend on
this fact, it would require that the claim be dismissed. This would be an example
of collateral estoppel by a "constituent" fact, as opposed to "congeries" of fact repre-
sented by a general finding on the claim. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text
supra.
70. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is flexible in its allowance of extrinsic
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glaring defect in the court's analysis is that it treats the state finding
as one of a singular factual issue, rather than as an issue of fact so en-
tangled with an overlay of legal issues that it is impossible to extract
with confidence the one factual finding relevant to the second suit.
The state court issue was decided as one of mixed fact and law; the
federal court issue wai one of fact alone. Therefore the issues were
not the same in both suits. The issues being different, no estoppel
should have attached.7'
FRANK LANE WILLIAMSON
Civil Procedure-Kidd v. Early: Summary Judgment on Testi-
monial Evidence in North Carolina
In Cutts v. Casey' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that any
testimonial evidence submitted in support of a motion for a directed
verdict created an issue of credibility to be presented to the jury. This.
holding gave rise to dire predictions 2 that the North Carolina summary
judgment procedure would be crippled. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, has narrowed the scope of Cutts by setting guidelines
for determining when an issue of credibility actually arises.
In Kidd v. Early' the court granted summary judgment4 for the
evidence to show whaj was decided in the first suit. The holding in the instant case
thus could possibly have been redeemed if the court had examined the trial record
and, say, found the level of evidence against a threat having been made so overwhelm-
ing as to support a partial directed verdict in an antitrust trial. With such a demonstra-
tion, the ambiguity of the judge's findings could justifiably have been disregarded.
71. The instant case should at least remind us that the "lesson" preached by
Professor Vestal has not been thoroughly learned: "One of the lessons which must
be learned is that great exactness must be used in determining the issues decided in
Suit I and to be decided -in Suit .. . . In the years ahead, it will be necessary
to use more finesse in the area." Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Nature
of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158, 192 (1965). The basic value of Azalea
is to point out that refinement of collateral estoppel technique is needed to insure
that the "fit" between issues is a close one.
1. 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971).
2. Louis, A Survey of Decisions Under the New North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, 50 N.C.L. REv. 729 (1972); Note, Civil Procedure-Cutts v. Casey Extended
to Summary Judgment, 54 N.C.L. Rv. 940 (1976).
3. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976).
4. Pursuant to N.C.R. Crv. P. 56. The North Carolina Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were enacted in 1970. Rule 56 enables a court to grant final judgment for a
